[ISSUE&INSIGHT: X이벤트 ④] 탈진실운동(post-fact movements)의 심리학
- 국가비전과 전략연구
- 위원회 및 연구단
- 발행기관경제ㆍ인문사회연구회
- 연구자토마스 브루더만(Thomas Brudermann)
주요내용
토마스 브루더만(Thomas Brudermann)
오스트리아 그라츠대학 교수
요약
사회 전환(societal transition), 사회 변화(social change), 극한 상황(extreme event) 등은 일반 대중들에게 불확실성을 안겨주는 요소이다. “군중 심리(mass psychology)”에 의해 촉발되는 현상들 역시 그 이면을 살펴보면 이러한 상황들이 원인으로 작용한다. 이런 상황에서는 개개인의 이성적 사고보다는 집단 차원의 심리적 혹은 감정적 전염이 우세하게 되고, 의견이나 주장이 사실을 대체한다. 친트럼트 성향의 “미국을 다시 위대하게 만들기(MAGA)” 운동 추종자들이나 코로나 봉쇄조치에 반대하는 독일의 “크베어뎅커(Querdenker), 즉 생각이 다른 사람들” 혹은 유럽 전역의 반코로나 시위대들은 군중 심리에 의한 탈진실운동의 대표적인 예이다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 탈진실운동의 확산을 부추기는 심리학적 메커니즘에 대해 살펴보도록 하겠다.
우리는 확증 편향과 반향실 효과의 피해자이다.
물론 모두가 모든 스토리를 쉽게 믿는 것은 아니다. 스토리는 스토리를 듣는 사람에게 어필할 수 있어야 한다. 스토리가 듣는 사람의 세계관에 부합할 때 스토리는 설득력을 얻게 된다. 일반적으로 인간은 새로운 정보를 바탕으로 자신의 관점을 끊임없이 업데이트하는 방식으로 정보를 처리하지는 않는다. 오히려 그 반대이다. “확증 편향(confirmation bias)” 10) 이라고 부르는 인지 오류 때문에 인간은 자신이 가지고 있던 기존의 가정에 위배되는 증거는 무시하고 오히려 자신이 가진 가정을 뒷받침하는 증거를 찾는다. 그 결과, 자신의 관점과 대치되는 정보는 즉각 폐기하거나 자신의 관점에 맞추어 해당 정보를 왜곡해 해석한다. 예를 들면, 기후 변화의 존재를 강하게 부정하는 사람들은 봄철 꽃샘추위를 기후변화에 반대되는 증거라고 믿는다. 그러면서 “지구 온난화라면 봄에도 날이 더워야 하는데, 날이 추운 걸 보니 지구 온난화가 아니다”라고 주장한다. 반면 기후 변화를 사실로 받아들이는 사람들은 똑같은 봄철의 한파를 기후 변화에 따른 이상 기후라고 해석한다. 따라서 동일한 사건에 대한 해석은 기존의 신념이나 세계관에 따라 크게 좌우된다. 설사 증거가 있어도 강한 신념은 좀처럼 뒤집기 쉽지 않다. 오히려 객관적인 증거를 “가짜 뉴스” 혹은 조작된 사실이라고 폄하하고 무시한다.
소셜 미디어는 이러한 확증 편향을 더욱 증폭시키는 반향실 효과11)를 불러일으킨다. 페이스북이나 트위터의 타임라인은 유저들에게 비슷한 생각을 하는 다른 사람들이나 사이트를 보여주는 방식으로 구성되어 있다. 유저 한 명의 타임라인에서 모든 다양한 의견을 볼 수는 없다. 유저들은 기존의 자신의 생각을 확인해주는 정보나 의견만을 보게 된다. 자신들만의 버블 안에서 비슷한 생각한 가진 유저들은 자신들과 반대되는 의견을 가진 아웃사이더들에 맞서 자신들의 의견을 재확인한다. 예를 들면 MAGA 추종자들은 다른 MAGA 추종자들이 올린 게시물만을 보게 되고, 크베어뎅커(Querdenker) 시위대는 다른 크베어뎅커 시위대가 올린 게시물만 보게 된다. 자신이 알고 있는 사람들은 모두 같은 후보를 지지했는데 정작 반대편 후보가 선거에서 승리한다면, 이것은 부정 선거 때문이라고 믿게 되지 않을까?
MAGA 추종자들의 관점에서는 유권자의 과반수 이상이 자신들과는 다른 견해를 가지고 있었다는 통계적 사실보다는 과거 위대했던 나라를 다시 재건하고자 했던 대통령을 무너뜨리기 위해 부정선거가 이루어졌다는 스토리가 훨씬 설득력 있게 다가온다. 군중 심리에서 스토리는 반드시 사실일 필요는 없다. 스토리는 단순하고 호소력 있고 반복해서 전달되면 된다. 소셜 미디어의 반향실과 필터 버블은 서로 강화 작용을 하게 되고 스토리에 따라 행동하는 인간들의 성향을 더욱 증폭시킨다. 유발 노아 하라리(Yuval Noah Harari)는 이러한 현상을 다음과 같이 설명한다. “인간들은 항상 탈진실 시대를 살아왔다. 호모사피엔스 역시 탈진실형 인간으로 호모사피엔스의 힘은 얼마나 신화를 잘 지어내고 허구를 잘 믿게 만드는가에 따라 결정된다.” 12)
저자 주) 9/11 사태 이후 많은 미국인들은 운송수단으로 비행기 대신 자동차를 더 선호하게 되었다. 다만 사람들이 비행기를 기피했던 것처럼 고층빌딩도 기피했는지 여부는 명확히 밝혀진 바는 없다.
토마스 브루더만(Dr. Thomas Brudermann)은 오스트리아 그라츠대학 교수로 시스템과학, 혁신 및 지속가능성 연구소에서 일하고 있다. 주 연구 관심사는 의사 결정, 선택메카니즘과 넛지( Nudge), 지속 가능한 개발, 에너지 전환, 복잡계 적응 시스템, 청정 기술의 도입과 확산, 그리고 집단역학과 대중심리학이다. 또한 X이벤트에 대한 글로벌 연구네트워크인 GXN 의 Vienna센터 회원이기도 하다. 연락처: Thomas.Brudermann@uni-graz.at 및 http://homepage.uni-graz.at/thomas.brudermann/ |
참고문헌
1. Casti, J. L. (2012). X-Events: The Collapse of Everything. William Morrow, New York.
2. Spitzer, M., Fischbacher, U., Herrnberger, B., Grön, G., Fehr, E.: The Neural Signature of Social Norm Compliance. Neuron. 56, 185-196 (2007).
3. Riesman, D. (1952): The Lonely Crowd. A study of the changing American character. Yale Nota Bene, New Haven.
4. Schachter, S., Singer, J.: Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional states. Psychological Review. 69, 379-399 (1962).
5. Brudermann, T. (2014). Mass Psychology revisited—Insights from Social Psychology, Neuroscience and Simulation. In Weidmann U, Kirsch U & Schreckenberg M (eds.): Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 39-54
6. Brudermann, T. (2010): Massenpsychologie. Psychologische Ansteckung, kollektive Dynamiken, Simulationsmodelle [Mass Psychology. Psychological Contagion, Collective Dynamics, Simulation Models]. Springer, Wien/New York.
7. Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk Savvy: How To Make Good Decisions. Penguin, London.
8. Gaissmaier, W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012). 9/11, Act II: A Fine-Grained Analysis of Regional Variations in Traffic Fatalities in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks. Psychological Science, 23(12), 1449–1454.
9. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-56616119
10. Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220.
11. Harari, Y. N. (2018). 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. Vintage / Penguin Random House, London.
12. Kindleberger Charles P. and Aliber, Robert Z. (1978/2005). Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crisis. 5th Edition, JohnWiley & Sons, New Jersey.
※ 해당 콘텐츠는 경제·인문사회연구회의 공식 입장이 아님을 알려드립니다.
The psychology of post-fact movements
by Thomas Brudermann*, University of Graz
Synopsis
Societal transitions, social change and extreme events are often a source of uncertainty for citizens. Such circumstances provide a ground for phenomena driven by “mass psychology” in which individual reasoning is replaced by psychological contagion and facts are replaced by opinions. The MAGA followers (“Make America great again”, pro-Trump movement), the "Querdenker" ("lateral thinkers", movement against Corona restrictions) in Germany or also the anti-Corona protesters across Europe are prime examples of post-fact movements driven by mass psychology. In this article I discuss the psychological mechanisms that make such movements successful.
I. We live in an era of change.
For centuries, the daily lives of one generation were not radically different compared to that of the prior generation. Leaving aside occasional wars, a change of political circumstances or a minor technological innovation, kids would overall end up living a life quite similar to their parents’ lives.
The globalization and accelerating industrialization in 20th century brought massive changes. In addition, the digitalization of the last decades speeded up the rate of change in unprecedented ways. A person born in Europe’s countryside during the 1950s might have grown up without electricity, walked to school for an hour or more in the absence of other means of transport, ate meat only at rare occasions and used to have a bath less than once per week – like dozens of generations before. The same person today might book a spa-retreat by touching the screen of their smartphone, drive in an electric vehicle with the help of a navigation system and will find more variety in the dinner menu than in their entire childhood diet (and likely post a picture of it in their WhatsApp story or Facebook timeline to notify friends overseas).
Already this single example makes it rather obvious that we have experienced, and still are experiencing, major changes in all levels of society. The ongoing transitions threaten old and established structures, including those in economic and political systems. The fragility of these structures becomes especially apparent in the face of an unexpected extreme event with high impact (or “X-Event”1)) such as the current pandemic. In the midst of large-scale societal transitions, which come with uncertainty themselves, a X-event increases uncertainties even more. For a mass psychologist it therefore comes as no surprise that, suddenly, also extreme political positions driven by negative sentiment are again receiving strong resonance in many parts of the world. Ordinary citizens in large numbers have become susceptible to political ideas which would not have been taken all too seriously just a decade or two ago. But why and how did this happen?
II. We are susceptible to psychological contagion.
Humans are social animals. Although we do have the ability to think on our own and to rationalize our decisions, our thinking is rarely free of social influence.2) What others do, what they think and how they react to our behaviors (or how we expect them to react) is shaping our thoughts and decisions in one way or the other. This “other-directedness” 3) is becoming especially strong under two circumstances4) : The first factor is uncertainty, and the second is emotional arousal. If people lack information on facts or if they do not understand facts, they seek for explanations in their surroundings – and they will find explanations from their peers, friends, social media or influencers. Emotional arousal amplifies this tendency and when people are excited, scared or angry, they are more willing to accept explanations provided by others. These two elements, uncertainty and arousal, are at the core of post-fact movements driven by “mass psychology”. As a result of mass psychology, we have seen different kinds of phenomena: speculative bubbles on financial markets (decoupled from economic facts but driven by euphoria), bank runs before or during financial crashes (driven by fear), fashion hypes (driven by joy) or violent demonstrations (driven by anger). The transmission of the underlying emotion – be it enthusiasm, anger or fear – is similar to the transmission of a virus: When in the center of an angry mob, we become angry as well, when surrounded by euphoric investors rushing to buy stocks of a hyped corporation, we become euphoric as well and during a stampede we become as scared and frightened as the others around us. Emotions can be contagious, and they become even more contagious when shared by many.
The circumstances in place play a substantial role for the success of a “psychological virus”. Like a flu virus that is thriving in cold weather during wintertime, psychological viruses need a similar fertile ground to spread. Simulations which try to model psychological contagion suggest that minor changes in one circumstantial parameter can make a difference whether a psychological virus fuels a mass movement successfully or not. 5) 6) .
Looking at contemporary post-fact movements, we find both elements:
(1) Uncertainty, because people do not have, do not understand or do not trust the facts. Topics like virology, climate change or economics can be complex and are rarely genuinely understood by the general public. It is tempting to turn to others who offer simple explanations and to narratives that fit into ones existing worldviews. It certainly is more convenient than engaging in individual reasoning in an attempt to analyze scientific facts.
(2) Emotional arousal, which in post-fact movements is mainly driven by a negative sentiment. This can be observed in the angry MAGA mob who believes that they need to defend their country/president from a treacherous attack or the anxious anti-vaccination mobs who believe that they need to defend their freedom against repressive health policies.
III. We embrace stories rather than facts.
Humans are social animals, but we are also storytelling animals. Human brains are challenged when they need to process numbers or mathematical probabilities.7) Decades of research in behavioral economics have shown that humans are not good in calculating (conditional) probabilities and not particularly capable in processing and understanding risks. Humans often overestimate the likelihood of improbable events (such as dying from the side effects of a vaccination) and underestimate the likelihood of fairly probable events (such as dying from a stroke or heart attack). It is estimated that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US more people died from indirect effects than from the attack itself – because people avoided the relatively safe short-haul flights and switched to the relatively more dangerous long car rides instead.8)
In related experiments, participants were willing to pay more for a life insurance that was only covering terrorist attacks than for a general life insurance which was covering all possible causes of death. Needless to say, the general life insurance at the same price is the better product. However, humans more easily relate to concrete scenarios, such as dying in a terrorist attack, than to abstract scenarios and general storylines. In this vein, the story of a healthy 42-year-old Jane Doe, mother of two, who tragically died from thrombosis after receiving a Corona vaccine can be a much more convincing argument than statistics showing a thrombosis risk of .0002%9). When a tragical single case activates our fears, even the most promising statistics cannot fully eradicate them.
IV. We are victims to our confirmation bias and echo chambers.
Of course not everybody is willing to believe every story. The story also needs to be appealing to the listener, and a story is appealing when it fits to ones worldview. In general, humans do not process information in a way that constantly updates personal views based on new information. Quite the contrary: a well-known cognitive fallacy called the “confirmation bias10)” makes humans look for evidence that supports their assumptions and neglect evidence that disproves their assumptions. As a consequence, information that contradicts ones views is quickly discarded or interpreted in a way that fits. For example, people who strongly deny the existence of climate change will likely understand a cold wave in springtime as evidence against climate change (arguing that it is cold, and if there was global warming it would be warm in spring”). People who accept climate change as a fact will understand the same cold wave in spring as a weather anomaly that is consistent with a changing climate. Thus, the interpretation of the very same event is heavily biased through existing beliefs and worldviews. Strong beliefs are hardly reversed through evidence. Instead, potential evidence is discarded as “fake news” or reframed.
Social media amplifies the effect of the confirmation bias. The timelines of Facebook or Twitter are organized in a way that users are mainly shown the posts of like-minded individuals and sites. The full diversity of opinions is not presented in one users timeline. Users will almost exclusively find information and opinions that confirm their existing mindsets. Within their own bubble, like-minded users re-affirm each other against opposing positions of outsiders. MAGA supporters only see postings of other MAGA supporters, as Querdenker people only see postings of other Querdenker people. When everybody you know and interact with voted for the same candidate, but the other candidate won, what else can you possibly believe than that the election was rigged?
The storyline of a rigged election against a president who was rebuilding a once great and proud nation is, from a MAGA supporter’s perspective, definitely more appealing than the statistical fact that a majority of voters just had a different opinion. In mass psychology a story does not need to be true. It just needs to be simple and appealing, and it needs to be repeated over and over again. The echo chambers and filter bubbles on social media guarantee both parts and only amplify the human tendency of acting upon narratives. As Yuval Noah Harari puts it: “Humans have always lived in the age of post-truth. Homo sapiens is a post truth-species, whose power depends on creating myths and believing fictions.”11)
V. Is there a way out?
Mass movements driven by mass psychology are not new nor recent phenomena. Human history is full of examples of deluded crowds engaging in emotional and destructive initiatives. Isaac Newton, after losing considerable amounts of money in one of the early financial bubbles (South sea bubble, 1720), supposedly said: “I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people.”12)
Although never predictable, we can try to understand the “madness” Newton was referring to, and attempt to mitigate the effects before the full destructive potential is unfolded. Situations that are characterized by uncertainty and new situations for which people lack experience, facilitate the emergence of mass movements which are decoupled from facts. Once a post-fact movement has grown, trying to reason with its followers – who mistrust all sources except those who reassure their beliefs – is nearly impossible. Especially in a highly polarized society, the destructive effects of such movements therefore should not be underestimated.
Essentially, no human society is immune against the emergence of mass psychological phenomena and the fundamental psychological mechanisms underlying them. However, factors that contribute to the overall resilience of a society, such as mutual trust and cooperation, high confidence in institutions, high levels of (income) equality and a good education system, can at least lower the susceptibility to post-fact narratives.
Note
After 9/11, many Americans switched from airplanes to cars. Whether skyscrapers were avoided in the same way as airplanes is not entirely clear.
* Dr. Thomas Brudermann is affiliated with the Institute of Systems Sciences, Innovation and Sustainability Research at University of Graz, and member of the X-Center Vienna. His research deals with human decision making, societal transitions and sustainable development. Contact: Thomas.Brudermann@uni-graz.at and http://homepage.uni-graz.at/thomas.brudermann/
References
1. Casti, J. L. (2012). X-Events: The Collapse of Everything. William Morrow, New York.
2. Spitzer, M., Fischbacher, U., Herrnberger, B., Grön, G., Fehr, E.: The Neural Signature of Social Norm Compliance. Neuron. 56, 185-196 (2007).
3. Riesman, D. (1952): The Lonely Crowd. A study of the changing American character. Yale Nota Bene, New Haven.
4. Schachter, S., Singer, J.: Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional states. Psychological Review. 69, 379-399 (1962).
5. Brudermann, T. (2014). Mass Psychology revisited—Insights from Social Psychology, Neuroscience and Simulation. In Weidmann U, Kirsch U & Schreckenberg M (eds.): Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 39-54
6. Brudermann, T. (2010): Massenpsychologie. Psychologische Ansteckung, kollektive Dynamiken, Simulationsmodelle [Mass Psychology. Psychological Contagion, Collective Dynamics, Simulation Models]. Springer, Wien/New York.
7. Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk Savvy: How To Make Good Decisions. Penguin, London.
8. Gaissmaier, W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012). 9/11, Act II: A Fine-Grained Analysis of Regional Variations in Traffic Fatalities in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks. Psychological Science, 23(12), 1449–1454.
9. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-56616119
10. Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220.
11. Harari, Y. N. (2018). 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. Vintage / Penguin Random House, London.
12. Kindleberger Charles P. and Aliber, Robert Z. (1978/2005). Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crisis. 5th Edition, JohnWiley & Sons, New Jersey.